Watershed for New Zealand Dairy industry by Quigley, Neil & Evans, Lewis
he New Zealand Dairy Board and the local
dairy co-operative have been as much 
a part of New Zealand life as the cheese
segments and the Marmite sandwiches that
have been lunchbox staples for generations of
New Zealand school children. On our overseas
holidays we have been chuffed to see 
New Zealand brands in the dairy chillers of
foreign supermarkets and we are somewhat
smug about our perceived national competitive
advantage in producing dairy products, despite
the large distances to our biggest markets. 
So why change?
There is nothing more certain in this
world than the inevitability that the 
New Zealand dairy industry’s current competi-
tive advantage will fade away, as the sources 
of that advantage – our relatively low produc-
tion costs – are replicated or bettered by our
competitors. The experience of the US dairy
industry is illustrative. In the 1930s dairy
producers in New York State had the lowest unit
production cost for raw milk. This leading
position was overtaken by Wisconsin farmers 
in the 1950s, capitalising on the relatively lower
cost of land in that state. This competitive
advantage was in turn lost to the California
industry due largely to the availability of cheap
cattle feed. But this advantage was eroded by
the 1980s water shortages.
These days, in some industries, fast-
moving technological change means that
competitive advantages may be very short-lived.
Horizons of 18 months or less are not unusual,
with some lasting only a matter or weeks.1
Irrespective of the sources of competitive
advantage for the New Zealand dairy industry 
– technology, climatic conditions, input costs,
currency factors or other reasons – the
challenge today is to lever as much value as
possible from that advantage, for as long as it
may last, while continuing to seek out new
advantages for the future, for example livestock
improvement, product development and
diversification, improved management
practices and new market development.  For
New Zealand, one source of advantage may lie
in developing a new business model, such as
merging production, processing, marketing and
distribution into a single vertically-integrated
company.
Indeed, consolidation of the industry
through mergers and acquisitions has been
ongoing since the 1930s, with a steady fall in
the number of processing companies. This
horizontal integration was made possible by
technological changes, largely in transportation
and processing. However, a co-operative owned
diary board that is the sole exporter and
regulator has inhibited other ways in which one
industry might develop and now, because of
the size of the two major co-operatives, is the
source of export/processing dislocation, rather
than co-ordination.
The merger of Kiwi Dairies, New Zealand
Dairy Group and the New Zealand Dairy Board
may be seen as the next step in such consolida-
tion. However it cannot be achieved without a
co-ordinated package of legislative change,
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structural realignment and a redesign of the
regulatory framework in which the dairy
industry operates.
Creating a regulatory framework that
enables open entry of farmers, processors and
marketers will foster the next stage in the
development of the dairy industry in 
New Zealand and is key to ensuring that the
window of opportunity presented at this point
in time, and the advantages that can be levered
from the new business model, are not lost.
Adrian Orr
Chairman, NZ Institute for the Study of
Competition and Regulation
Chief Economist, WestpacTrust
1 See ‘The world is Spinning Faster’, Competition and Regulation Times, 
Issue 1, June 2000, NZISCR newsletter: www.iscr.org.nz/newsletter






Down on the Farm 
is Going Global 3
Can a Large Single 
Co-operative 
be Efficient? 5
The Price of Milk and 
the Value of Capital 7
The Discipline of Open
Entry and Exit 9
What Does Open 
Entry to and Exit from




A Market is Born 15
Regulating 
Global Dairy 16
The Market for 
Genetic Information
in the Dairy Industry 18
Does the New Zealand
Dairy Industry Have
Market Power in 
Foreign Markets? 22
Global Dairy and 
Competition Law 24
Requiem for 
the Dairy Board 27
New Zealand Institute for the Study
of Competition and Regulation Inc
P O Box 600, Wellington, 
New Zealand. Ph. 64 4 463 5562, 
Fax 64 4 463 5566, 
E-mail: iscr@vuw.ac.nz, 
Website: www.iscr.org.nz
The ISCR editorial team for this
publication was Judy Kavanagh,
Maureen Revell and George Crosby.
WATERSHED  FOR  NEW ZEAL AND DA IR Y  INDUSTR Y  –  PAGE  3
he dairy industry is New Zealand's only
industry of global scale: it operates in
more than 120 countries and territories around
the world and contributes up to 5% of
New Zealand’s GDP. 
In the 19th century even the smallest of
communities had their own dairy company,
many of which were privately-owned ‘for profit ’
companies, to process the milk supplied by the
farmers. The first co-operative dairy company
was formed in 1871 and this became the most
preferred form of ownership. Prior to refrigera-
tion and rapid transport, dairy farmers were
dependent on having facilities available to
process milk into longer lasting products such
as cheese and butter. They supported co-
operatively owned processing companies
because as suppliers to a co-operatively-owned
company farmers were able to elect directors,
keep an eye on management and have a say in
business decisions – and all profits from selling
dairy products were returned to farmers who
had supplied the milk 
The processing companies have a long
history of developing export markets. As early
as the 1840s cheese and butter were being
exported to Australia from Banks Peninsula.
The potential for an export industry in dairy
products emerged in 1882 when the ‘Dunedin’
sailed to London with the first refrigerated
shipment of meat and butter. Because local
processing companies were thought to be too
small to export efficiently, the government
established the Dairy Produce Export Control
Board in 1923 (which later became the New
Zealand Dairy Board), to control the export of
all dairy products from New Zealand. The
NZDB’s statutory single-desk status comes from
the Dairy Board Act 1961. The NZDB was princi-
pally formed to take advantage of economies of
scale, especially in transport and marketing,
and to avoid ‘weak selling’ (though this notion
rested on a popular misunderstanding of the
causes of the dramatic fall in commodity prices
in the early 1920s).  
The number of co-operative processing
companies has fallen from 499 in 1933 to 4 in
2001, indicating a trend towards the merger
and acquisition of processing companies. By
May 2001 two large dairy companies (the 
New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Co-
operative Dairies) and two smaller companies
(Tatua Co-operative Dairy Company Limited
and Westland Co-operative Dairy Company
Limited) had co-operative ownership of the
NZDB based on their respective milk produc-
tion (as at 31 May 2000 the respective
shareholdings were 58, 37, 1 & 3).1
Prior to the merger in June 2001 the co-
operative processing companies still competed
in the domestic market, but allocated their
produce to the NZDB for the purpose of
exporting, creating a vertically integrated dairy
industry in New Zealand. (See Fig. 1)
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Fig.1 – The Structure of the New Zealand Dairy Industry as at June 2001
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The structure of the New Zealand dairy
industry following the merger of the two big
processing co-operatives (New Zealand Dairy
Group and Kiwi Co-operative Dairies) and the
NZDB in June 2001 is shown above. The two
smaller co-operatives (not shown in the
diagram) have the option of joining Global
Dairy or being paid out their respective
shareholdings in the NZDB. At the time of
writing both plan to go their separate ways. The
essential aim of the merger is to achieve further
economies of scale and to eliminate processing,
distribution and marketing co-ordination
difficulties that occurred with the previous
structure. The NZDB has estimated that the cost
savings from the merger will be $300 million
dollars a year.  As a part of the restructuring, the
government will remove the single-desk seller
status of the NZDB, creating an opportunity for
other companies to export dairy products from 
New Zealand. And Global Dairy will be required
to sell its half share in the distribution
company, New Zealand Dairy Foods, to
promote competition in the domestic market.
It will retain Mainland which has a similar
distribution function. (See Fig. 2)
1 There are other small dairy companies in New Zealand that are not part
owners of the NZDB. One example is the 15-supplier dairy company in
Gisborne that supplies fresh and manufactured product widely in 
New Zealand. It supplies produce steadily across all seasons.  
If such companies export it is only with the permission of the NZDB.
New Zealand 





Fig.2 – The Structure of the New Zealand Dairy Industry as at June 2001
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cceptance of the Global Dairy merger
reaffirms dairy farmers’ commitment to
the co-operative form of business organisation.
A co-operative structure requires that farmers
must invest capital in, and have ownership of,
the processing operations of the co-operative in
proportion to the milk that they expect to
supply. 
Processor co-operatives were principally
established by farmers to avoid being at the
mercy of a monopoly purchaser they could not
control.1 If suppliers do not control the
monopoly processor they will be paid just the
minimum to ensure supply, and they miss out
on the surplus profit – rent – resulting from the
monopoly’s restriction of output.2 Co-operative
processors solve this problem by making the
suppliers the shareholders. Thus, if there are
any surplus profits they are returned to
suppliers in proportion to the milk that they
have contributed. 
However, monopoly co-operative proces-
sors may themselves produce inefficient levels
of output by restricting supplier entry to the co-
operative in situations where there is no threat
of competition from other potential processing
companies. Suppliers in the co-operative enjoy
monopoly profits at the expense of those that
are excluded. Open entry to the co-operative,
however, will generally result in a level of
production that is approximately economically
efficient. Open entry implies that a supplier’s
entry decision is purely based on the price to be
received and its cost of supply. 
Under open entry, suppliers will enter
until the costs of the last supplier – the cost of
the sheds, fences, irrigation and cows, and the
cost of the capital required by the co-operative
– will equal the benefit from entry. In short, the
cost of the last kg of milk to enter the co-
operative will equal the price derived from the
output it produces. This equality of cost and
price is the efficient level of milk throughput. 
As long as there are no diseconomies of
scale in processing this argument applies no
matter what the co-operative’s market share is.
If processors emerge that have lower cost
structures, or dairy product prices fall so that
other farm activities are more profitable, it will
be efficient for suppliers to exit the co-operative
and take up alternative activities that produce
more profit, or value added. Open exit requires
that a cost-benefit decision by the supplier to
leave the co-operative is not impeded by non-
commercial barriers constructed by the co-
operative. 
Clearly, both open entry and exit are
required for the co-operative to perform
efficiently. If supplier entry or exit are inhibited
the co-operative may produce an inefficient
level of output, and/or produce at a cost that is
higher than the efficient level. 
The performance of a dairy co-operative
is complicated by the practice of bundling.
Because there is no competitive contract
market for raw milk and hence no market price,
the return on capital is bundled in one pay-out
to suppliers.
However, this form of bundling need not
preclude economic efficiency because the
amount of share capital required is tied to the
volume of milk supplied and suppliers will
consider both their supply cost of raw milk and
the capital requirements as their (marginal) cost
of entry. If there are constant returns to scale
the outcome will approximate the efficient
level of output. There is no requirement for
products to be sold in competitive commodity
markets for this result to hold. It remains valid
providing that the co-operative is earning a
competitive return in processing, marketing
and investment in product differentiation and
there is open entry and exit.
A
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A second form of bundling occurs when
excess returns are persistently obtained from
milk products sold in high value markets – e.g.
quota rents – and these returns are bundled
together with returns from milk commodity
markets and result in a bundled price to
suppliers. As this price is above the price of
additional milk, it will encourage inefficient
over-production as suppliers respond to the
excessive bundled pay-out. Because milk is
essentially a homogeneous commodity the
efficient supplier price is the price in its lowest
value use (the commodity milk price), and
higher returns from, for example, product
differentiation or quotas should be separately
attributed to these activities.3
Under open entry a co-operative will
have every incentive to ensure that suppliers
are paid no more than the price derived from
the milk they add to the processing business to
ensure that existing suppliers will not be made
worse off by the entry of suppliers responding
to some other price. The only way this can be
done is to separate out the excess returns and
have any right to them purchased by entering
suppliers at a valuation the reflects an assess-
ment of the future excess returns. If the right to
existing excess returns (for example, quota rents
that are likely to persist) and the returns to
processing capital are separated out and
purchased at a ‘fair market value’ upon entry,
efficient production levels can be approximated
under the co-operative structure.
In the past, dairy co-operatives in 
New Zealand have had the power to decline
applications for membership and to inhibit exit
by retaining the value of the exiting supplier’s
processing capital in the co-operative for up to
five years. If suppliers had a choice of co-
operatives then all institutional structures in
the dairy industry, including restrictions on
entry to and exit from each co-operative, and
all prices set within the industry, would be
competitively determined. In this case, there
would be no economic efficiency issues raised
by the institutional structures and pricing
policies in the industry. The situation with
respect to the newly formed Global Dairy 
is different because in its initial market position
it will approximate a monopoly purchaser.
Global Dairy could use this dominant position
to restrict the entry and exit of suppliers and
thus produce less than the efficient level of
output. Global Dairy’s position will also ensure
that it has the best information about costs,
prices and most other facets of the industry.
This level of market dominance suggests that
regulation should be designed to ensure that
entry and exit are not impeded, and informa-
tion asymmetry suggests that regulation should
utilise incentives for information to be revealed
in the regulatory process, rather than rely on
heavy monitoring and oversight.
1 The co-operative form also provided a way of solving co-ordination
problems – such as milk collection – between the farms and the co-
operatives.  However this is less of a problem with modern refrigeration
and transport technology.
2 Monopoly requires that there is some limitation on entry to processing.
Economies of scale in local plant may mean it is efficient for there to be
just one local processor, but it will have only limited monopoly power if
entry is feasible.
3 If quotas were auctioned off then quota rents would be eliminated.
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he funds available for Global Dairy to
distribute to suppliers (after payments of
processing and marketing costs) comprise 
the returns to processing, rents from allocation
of foreign quota and the price of raw milk.
Capitalising the expected future returns to
quota and processing into their value will be
crucial to suppliers’ entry and exit decisions. 
But how will total returns to Global Dairy
be allocated and who will do the allocation?
The ‘how’ is complex: in an efficient market the
milk price would be the wholesale commodity
price of raw milk but the market for raw milk in
New Zealand is very thin – there are few partic-
ipants – and with the formation of Global Dairy
it will be, at least initially, even thinner.
Furthermore, because a supplier’s capital is
determined by the amount of milk supplied
and the shares are not tradable, there will be no
market valuation of the capital invested in
Global Dairy. Without a market milk price or
market valuation of capital, the different
components of the total return will have to be
unbundled through some administrative
mechanism.
There are two approaches for calculating
the raw-milk price and thus the return on
suppliers’ capital. The bottom-up approach
would be to define what is meant by a
‘commodity’ use of milk and obtain the average
price, net of processing costs, across all
markets. The problem with this approach is that
the definition of a ‘commodity’ is not precise
and requires judgement. For example, is a basic
product that has been concentrated by an
innovative process to squeeze more out of a
market access restriction still a commodity? A
second problem is that the calculation requires
a great deal of information that is properly the
commercial property of Global Dairy. Thirdly
and less importantly there are measurement
issues surrounding the calculation of the
average.  
A second approach to calculating the milk
price is to estimate the quota rents and 
a ‘normal’ return on the assets employed in
processing, distribution and marketing,
subtract these from the gross income of
Global Dairy, and call this residual the payment
for raw milk. The normal return on processing,
distribution and marketing assets would be
used to calculate a fair market value of these
assets. The use of best-practice production cost
estimates would mean that any costs or
benefits attached to Global Dairy’s departure
from best practice would not be reflected in 
the estimated price of raw milk, but would be
borne by Global Dairy’s assets. This top-down
approach to valuation requires good estimates
of best-practice processing and marketing costs
that will be subject to much uncertainty and
judgements about which experts may legiti-
mately have different views. Indeed, this is
likely to be more complex than the calculation
of telecommunications services costs, for which
there has been much research, many models
built, and yet for which there remains much
scope for differences in view about the correct
methodology as well as the correct price.  A top-
down approach also requires the use of
commercially sensitive information that is the
property of Global Dairy. 
Both methods are likely to have implica-
tions for the relationship between the price of
milk and the value of capital in processing,
distribution and marketing. The profitability 
of the dairy industry will continue to fluctuate
with factors such as the value of the 
New Zealand dollar and world commodity
prices just as it has in the past. Should asset
values and milk prices go up in good years or
are they unrelated or even negatively related?
T
The Price of Milk and 









WATERSHED  FOR  NEW ZEAL AND DA IR Y  INDUSTR Y  –  PAGE  8
The source of the variation may have differing
effects. Fluctuations in world demand as a
result of fluctuations in economic growth may,
arguably, yield an increase in the milk price if
the demand for commodity milk expands
relative to that of value added products.
However the milk price may not go up if higher
value products are in relatively greater demand
than commodity milk. The extent, or even
existence, of such relationships is speculative
and may differ between the two approaches. In
the bottom up approach any surplus generated
by economies of scale in processing, distribu-
tion and marketing will be reflected in the
valuation of Global Dairy’s capital. In the top-
down approach, the allocation of the bounty
will depend upon how the best practice costs
are calculated and scale economies are treated.
The concept of a normal return suggests it
should be the milk price that reflects higher
returns to processing, distribution and
marketing.
Whoever sets the milk price has a
challenging job, but if it is Global Dairy at least
it has the best information to do so.1 Efficient
use will be made of this information if Global
Dairy has incentives to utilise it to set prices.
With open entry and exit, Global Dairy will have
strong incentives to set the correct valuation of
processing capital (equivalent to the fair value
price) and the associated efficient price for milk.
If it over-values the capital relative to the price
of milk there will be exit by suppliers when
their supply would be profitable to the co-
operative. If it sets the capital value too low
there will be a demand for entry beyond that
which would be profitable. In short there are
strong incentives for Global Dairy to set the
‘right ’ value of the capital invested in process-
ing, whichever method is used to do the
calculation. Indeed, both methods require that
the price that is set be forward looking.2
Because it will reflect anticipated effects on
supplier entry and exit and the extent of
earnings retained for investment, the milk price
(capital valuation) decision has a significant
forward-looking element and therefore
provides (publicly) a best estimate of the value
of processing capital.
Since open entry and exit provide Global
Dairy with the incentive to set the capital value
at the efficient level, and because a regulator
has neither the incentive nor the information
that Global Dairy has, it is efficient for the
regulator to ensure open entry and exit rather
than attempt to regulate the price of milk.
Furthermore this approach places the strategic
decision of the milk price on those who have
the responsibility for working in the interests of
Global Dairy. If the milk price were to be
regulated, this responsibility would be shared
between the regulator and Global Dairy
management and reduce the accountability of
the management for performance of the
company.
1 In fact it is proposed that the milk price and the valuation of capital will be
determined by the Shareholders’ Council.
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ow does open entry and exit provide the
right incentives for efficient pricing?
Under the co-operative structure, suppliers
receive payments composed of three elements:
quota rents, return on processor capital and
payment for the milk itself.1 New entrants will
be required to put equity into the company
based on the co-operative’s valuation of the
capital share held by each existing supplier.
Suppliers that resign receive this ‘fair valuation’
of the capital they have in Global Dairy. What
are the implications of Global Dairy getting the
balance between these elements wrong? This
article considers four possible scenarios under
an open entry and exit regime. Note, the milk
price, the quota rent and the annualised share
valuations must add up to Global Dairy’s total
return.2
• Milk price is too high and the value 
of the equity is too low.  
This will result in Global Dairy making
payments for milk in excess of the
commodity price, and thus over time lead
to a deterioration in the capital base of
the company. New entrants will be
attracted by the high milk price and the
low equity required, increasing the
number of suppliers who must be paid at
these prices.3 For Global Dairy this
combination of inefficient prices will
produce a level of entry that will be
unsustainable.
• Milk price is too high and the value 
of the equity is too high.  
These prices will result in Global Dairy
making payments to suppliers that are in
excess of economic earnings and payments
to exiting suppliers that are in excess of the
true value of their capital. While this may
not result in net entry to or exist from
Global Dairy, its operating performance
will be unsustainable. The higher pay-outs
on milk and high price of equity will be
unsustainable since Global Dairy will be
depleting its balance sheet to sustain
them. This will in turn make the high price
of the equity increasingly unrealistic. 
At some point this may lead to a run on
Global Dairy by suppliers attempting to
exist in anticipation of the collapse of
the co-operative. This strategy is also
completely inconsistent with the stated
Global Dairy strategy of international
expansion and acquisition, which will
require it to raise more, not less, capital. 
• Milk price is too low and the value 
of the equity is too low.  
This will result in an accumulation of
profits in the company, which will make
the low equity price increasingly unrealis-
tic. Suppliers will respond by entering
Global Dairy in anticipation of obtaining
a share of the retained profits and this
will increase pressure from suppliers for 
a higher return on farm (milk earnings)
and processor capital.
• Milk price is too low and the value 
of the equity is too high.  
This will result in suppliers exiting Global
Dairy, responding to low returns for milk
and the high equity pay-out. There will be
no entry to offset the impact of this exit on
the balance sheet of Global Dairy. This
policy will be commercially unsustainable.
In all of these four cases open entry and
exit are central to the incentives for Global Dairy
to price efficiently. In the absence of open entry
and exit it may be possible to sustain inefficient
pricing policies over relatively long periods 
but in the presence of open entry and exit
inefficient policies will have a much more rapid
and substantial impact on the operating
position and sustainability of Global Dairy.
H
The Discipline of
Open Entry and Exit
1 Quota rents are not considered further in
this article.
2 These scenarios have been simplified to
illustrate the principles.  The actual
situation will be affected by potential and
actual suppliers’ expectations.
3 Actual entry will depend upon the extent
to which potential suppliers view the
imbalance in price and value as being
temporary or sustainable.
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he dairy industry merger includes draft
legislation for the regulatory framework
in which Global Dairy must operate. A key
characteristic of the proposed regulations is
that suppliers should encounter no barriers in
either becoming suppliers, and thus sharehold-
ers, of Global Dairy (open entry), or in leaving
Global Dairy (open exit).
As a potential or existing shareholder,
how might one determine whether there is
open entry and exit to and from Global Dairy?
And how might the regulations ensure that
Global Dairy operates an open entry and exit
regime? 
Open entry and exit is more likely where:
• Potential suppliers have essentially the
same characteristics as existing suppliers,
therefore the same contract can be made
available to them.
• The regulations define the minimum
conditions required for entry to and exit
from Global Dairy. This provides
incentives for Global Dairy management
to value capital and wholesale milk
prices at the efficient level. There can
therefore be no entry or exit subsidies.
• The regulations are based on readily
observable characteristics and
behaviours thus minimising the costs of
compliance for Global Dairy and the
costs of assessing claims that the regula-
tions have been breached. 
• The open entry and exit regime is 
consistent with the co-operative structure
of Global Dairy, and takes account of
reasonable Global Dairy concerns about
its liquidity, its milk processing capacity
and the transport costs associated with
accepting suppliers in remote locations. 
A regime that requires Global Dairy to
accept any supplier at its posted wholesale
supplier-contract price of milk may result in the
co-operative facing substantially increased
costs, if suppliers in very remote locations take
advantage of the cross-subsidy inherent in the
uniform return paid to all suppliers in most
regions. The proposed regulations do not allow
this, nevertheless potential entrants in remote
areas do have the option of paying to transport
milk to the nearest point where Global Dairy is
already collecting milk. Transportation costs
are not therefore an impediment to a success-
ful open entry and exit regime.
Entry may also be affected by Global
Dairy’s capacity to process milk. The regula-
tions pose a reasonable time frame for Global
Dairy to accept milk from any potential
supplier, so that the co-operative can prepare
for the additional capacity. Existing suppliers
who plan expansion will also be subject to the
same timeframes. Supplier exit from Global
Dairy may also raise planning and capacity
utilisation issues for the co-operative, but these
are unlikely to be as onerous as those associ-
ated with expansions in capacity.
There is no need for Global Dairy to own
specific assets, such as milk vats, sited on farms.
Indeed, ownership of such assets can lead to
disputes in the event of a supplier exiting the
co-operative. Assurance of milk quality and co-
ordination over the use of assets between
supplier and processor can be achieved
through contracts, as occurs in other primary
industries.1 Furthermore, under private
contracts suppliers’ capital commitment to
Global Dairy would be lower, thereby reducing
their capital ‘at risk’ in the co-operative.2
Global Dairy has expressed concerns
about any requirement that it pay out cash to
exiting suppliers and there is provision for
exiting suppliers to be paid the cash equivalent
of their capital value in capital notes.3
T
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These securities (with a rate of interest set at 
the date of issue) will be tradeable in financial
markets. A benefit of capital notes is that
tradeable Global Dairy securities will engage
financial analysts in monitoring the perform-
ance of the company. However payment in the
form of capital notes may require specialist
expertise on the part of the regulatory body to
determine whether the capital notes are indeed
equivalent to cash.  
In a large scale defection of suppliers,
Global Dairy may wish to avoid a ‘fire sale’ of
assets to raise sufficient cash. If more than 5%
of suppliers exit in any one year, they may
receive, at the discretion of Global Dairy’s
directors, a pro rata allocation of capital notes
and preference shares redeemable under
certain conditions. Although conditions relating
to exit should take account of Global Dairy’s
concerns about its liquidity, this aspect raises
several important issues, among them whether
the 5% rule is an impediment to exit. 
From the company’s point of view it is a
self-defence option in the event that a large
number of suppliers choose to exit, ie there is a
‘run on the bank’. But the fact is that banks
have to manage their affairs given the possibil-
ity of a run, so what is different about Global
Dairy? One possibility is that Global Dairy’s
assets are more specific in use and hence less
tradeable than bank assets.
In reality, major exits from Global Dairy
are likely to occur from a decline in the
profitability of dairy farming relative to other
land uses or if there is another significant
competitor in the market for raw milk.
Ironically, if there were competing co-
operatives the 5% threshold would be no issue.
Co-operatives would compete on ‘self-defence’
options, such as Global Dairy’s 5% threshold, as
well as on milk and capital prices and suppliers
would choose their processor with full
knowledge of these factors.
It is a lack of competition in milk process-
ing and marketing for the immediate future
that makes the 5% rule of concern. The lack of
competition implies that the rule applies for
almost all actual and potential suppliers of
milk. However the Global Dairy exit conditions
are less onerous than what had been applied by
the two large dairy co-operatives prior to the
merger, so the ruling does not add extra exit
barriers.
The actual effect of the rule may depend
on the nature of the strategic game that is
played between Global Dairy and a prospective
competitor. Any processor of significant size
entering the market will know about the rule
and address this in the way it competes and in
the contracts it offers. If it can establish the
belief that it can outperform Global Dairy, the
rule may even stimulate exit as it is possible
that being first to exit is more profitable. 
Of course Global Dairy’s suppliers are also
equity investors in the company. Equity invest-
ment is risky and there is no guarantee that a
supplier will make a normal return on 
the capital invested. The 5% rule reduces the
value of a supplier’s investment in the event 
of a run: it is the co-operative equivalent of
a declining share price in the corporate sector.
1 Boyd, Haleigh, Lewis Evans and Neil Quigley.  2000.  The Efficiency of
Contractual Arrangements in Private Agricultural Product Markets.  
NZISCR Research Paper: www.iscr.org.nz/research.
2 In fact, the regulations provide that Global Dairy sell the vat to the exiting
supplier at a ‘fair value’ price.
3 There would seem no compelling reason why exiting suppliers could not be
given the choice of having their capital paid out in cash or as notes.





avoid a ‘fire sale’
of assets to raise
sufficient cash”
WATERSHED  FOR  NEW ZEAL AND DA IR Y  INDUSTR Y  –  PAGE  12
nder the co-operative form of organisa-
tion, suppliers hold shares in proportion
to the input they supply.  The co-operative form
has the advantage of aligning the interests of
suppliers and owners. In addition, the homoge-
neous quality of milk measured by milk solids
means that all suppliers can be treated the
same.1 This lowers transactions costs for a dairy
co-operative and lessens the potential sources
of disputes between the co-operative and
suppliers and among suppliers. However there
are also disadvantages. Holding shares in
proportion to the input supplied has negative
implications for the effective supervision
and monitoring of management in the co-
operative organisation when compared to a
corporate organisation with tradable shares. 
Company performance is greatly
enhanced by active monitoring of manage-
ment by shareholders and debt-holders.
Monitoring requires resources and incentives.
For corporations with traded shares these
requirements are normally satisfied by having
shareholders with relatively large concentrated
shareholdings who can allocate resources to
monitoring and who have an ability to affect
strategy through positions on the board.
Relatively small shareholders normally have
access to fewer resources and weaker incentives
to monitor and affect management to the
extent that they rely on the effort of, and
appear to ‘free ride’ on, the monitoring of
larger shareholders.2
As share ownership is restricted by the
amount of milk supplied in large dairy co-
operatives, there is not the same concentrated
shareholding interest, and thus the same
intensity of managerial and strategic oversight,
as found in corporations where shares are
traded. Even the potential that one party might
require a concentrated shareholding may be
sufficient to promote efficiency in corporations
with traded shares. It might therefore be
expected that we would observe poorer
performance from co-operatives compared to
corporates. This is not necessarily the case for
smaller co-operatives, because the smaller the
co-operative the larger the influence of any
given shareholder. Moreover small co-
operatives face lower transactions costs that
may outweigh the costs resulting from the need
to maintain greater oversight of management
and make them relatively more efficient. But as
co-operatives get larger, relative performance
can be expected to place the weight of
advantage on traded corporations.
Global Dairy will have a ‘Shareholders’
Council’ elected by the suppliers under a
different process from that used to elect the
board of directors, and the council will have a
limited oversight role. The creation of a
Shareholders’ Council seems to suggest that
Global Dairy is aware that the governance of
large co-operatives has limited scope for
intensive effective managerial monitoring.
However the Shareholders’ Council cannot
substitute for a ‘concentrated interest ’ of
shareholders, and indeed provides no
additional incentive for Global Dairy to perform
well as an organisation.3
Companies typically raise capital through
debt or equity. When a company’s organisa-
tional structure provides less intense internal
monitoring, it affects the company’s ability to
raise debt. Any potential lender will want to be
assured that there are strong incentives for
shareholders to monitor the performance of
the company. Moreover, because share alloca-
tions are tied to milk supplied, equity capital
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through retained earnings or share issues. This
limits the source of capital for co-operatives
relative to traded corporations. This is an
important issue where profitable opportunities
for expansion exist.
Global Dairy intends to issue notes that
can be traded in financial markets. The
performance of these notes will reflect the
financial market ’s assessment of both Global
Dairy ’s past performance and its future
prospects and thereby signal a wider set of
views than those of the co-operative’s manage-
ment and board, or even of suppliers more
generally. Valuation of the notes will provide
some incentive for analysts to study and
monitor Global Dairy.
The proposal allowing share-milker share
ownership raises significant issues relating to
the structure of shareholding.4 If milk from a
farm is supplied partly by the farmer and partly
by the share-milker the number of sharehold-
ers will increase and thus the incentive and
individual resources to monitor Global Dairy
performance will be even weaker. As about 45%
of milk is currently being produced by share-
milkers there could be a very significant
increase in the number of shareholders. 
Importantly, if ownership of milk were to
become the basis of Global Dairy shareholding,5
this would provide a means by which concen-
trated shareholding could occur, to the benefit
of the company. Suppose that farmers and
share-milkers transferred their milk to a broker
who then supplied it to Global Dairy. The broker
– who could even be a farmer or share-milker –
might acquire sufficient ownership rights to
milk to create a large shareholding in the co-
operative.
There are usually good reasons for partic-
ular ownership arrangements that emerge over
time and this may be why share-milkers have
not been permitted to hold shares in dairy 
co-operatives to date. Any farmer has a great
deal of capital tied up in a dairy farm. (See
Farm Dairy Conversion: Capital table.) Some of
this capital is specific to dairy in the sense that
its value in any other use will be lower.6 In order
to commit to specific investment the farmer
will seek a long term contract that virtually
guarantees its use. The farmer can obtain such
a contract by owning shares in the local dairy
co-operative. Alternatively, suppose that the
farmer has no shares in the co-operative, but
the share-milker does and the share-milker
owns the cows. Because cows are mobile capital
the farmer’s dairy investment may be less
secure. The outcome of contract negotiations
between the farmer and share-milker will
depend on the supply and demand of both
sorts of capital. If share-milkers who own cows
are readily available the farmer can be secure in
investing in specific capital, but when they are
not, there will be uncertainty. The open entry
regime however removes uncertainty for
farmers who have invested in dairy-specific
capital even if they do not own Global Dairy
shares.
In sum, the proposed Global Dairy
organisational form will not solve all the
governance issues that make large co-
operatives less organisationally efficient than
tradable corporates. World wide there is a mix
of large co-operative and corporate dairy
companies. A table of ownership is presented
for information, however comparison is compli-
cated by factors such as the tax advantages
available to co-operatives in some countries.
1 Unless specifically differentiated according to factors such as transport cost
and season.
2 This is not to say that farmers do not have an incentive to monitor the co-
operative.  The shareholding in a co-operative is likely to be a major invest-
ment for any individual farmer.
3 Although the Shareholders’ Council oversees the valuation of the milk price,
it is the open entry and exit regime that provides the incentive for Global
Dairy to set the milk price at the optimal level. See ‘The Discipline Of Open
Entry and Exit ’, this issue.
4 Introducing share-milker shareholders has no implications for the act of
unbundling the pay-out among milk, processing, distribution and
marketing capital, or quota rents. Furthermore unbundling has no implica-
tions for share-milkers in that their existing contracts could be maintained.
For example, the 50% share-milker contract that is based on the fully
bundled pay-out could be maintained by a contract that allocated 50% of
each element of the total pay-out to the share-milker.
5 That is, ownership of shares is not limited by some occupational definition,
such as ‘dairy farmer’ and ‘share-milker’.
6 Obviously the milking plant, vat (usually supplied by the co-operative), and
aspects of the fencing will be specific to dairy farming.  Less obviously,
irrigation, while useful for other farming activities, may have its highest
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Dairy (60-bail rotary) 550,000
Electricity 50,000





Total Development $1,663,000 $3.81
Shares in the Co-operative $1,748,000 $4.00
Cows $1,750,000 $4.00
Land $1,660,000 $3.81
Total Capital $6,821,000 $15.61
Source: Country-Wide, Northern Edition, March 2001
This table is for a hypothetical farm with the following characteristics:
• 415 hectare farm in the Canterbury area ($4,000/ha)
• 1,400 cows ($1,250 ea.): 437,000 kgMS after 3 years
• Co-operative shares are at $4/kg of milk solids
• Two houses already on the property
• The farm already has some existing irrigation
• Two thirds of the farm has to be re-grassed
Points to note:
• Capital that is specific to dairy, as opposed to other farming, is
difficult to estimate, but it is at least (effluent, dairy, races and
earthworks, and cows) $2,418,000
• The share of co-operative capital is 25% of total capital
• Assuming a payout of $4.50/KgMS, that dairy is only just more
profitable than other uses of the land (for a debate see Country-
Wide, Northern Edition, April 2001) and that the farmer’s cost of
capital is 12% the cost structure is very approximately (in $/kgMS)
0.48 Processing/Distribution/Marketing: Co-operative 
capital Costs
1.39 On-Farm Capital Costs
2.63 On-Farm Operation Costs (wages etc)
4.50 Total Costs (=Revenue)
Farm Dairy Conversion: Capital 
World’s Top Dairy Companies
World’s Top Dairy 
Companies Turnover Major Country 
by Rank (NZ$M)# Type of Company Activities of Origin
1 Nestlé* 31,162 Multinational company listed on the Swiss, London, Paris   Diversified food products: dairy, Switzerland
and Frankfurt bourses. 49% of shares are Swiss owned, coffee, mineral water, infant foods,
14% USA, 9% France, 9% UK, 8% Germany and 11% others chocolate and others
2 Dean Foods 21,860 Publicly quoted company Dairy processing and dairy USA
/Suiza products, plastic packaging
3 Dairy Farmers 17,907 Co-operative with 24 000 members Milk supply, production of cheese, USA
of America butter and other dairy products
4 Kraft 15,349 Subsidiary of Phillip Morris (cigarette maker) Foods business: cheese USA
and others
5 Parmalat 14,419 International public company Dairy and other food products Italy
6 Arla Foods 13,023 Co-operative with 17,000 members Dairy products Denmark
7 Lactails 12,326 Family owned Dairy products France
8 Global Dairy 12,100 Co-operative Dairy processing and marketing New Zealand
9 Campina 12,093 Co-operative with 8,000 producer members. Voting rights Dairy foods Netherlands
Melkunie are in proportion to the quantity of milk supplied.
10 Snow Brand   11,395 Public company Milk products Japan
11 Unilever* 10,930 Joint venture between Unilever NV & Unilever PLC (both Packaged and consumer goods UK
public)
12 Friesland 10,465 Public and international Company branded Netherlands
Coberco dairy products
Sources: Mafekeni MA Thesis and Promar International Draft Report. * These results are for the dairy turnover of these companies. # based on NZ$1 = US$.43
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he regulatory framework will impose
some specific requirements relating to
the wholesale milk market. Although there will
be no regulatory requirement for Global Dairy
to develop such a market, Global Dairy has
incentives to do just that.1 A number of the
proposed regulations should be interpreted in
this light.
To get an indication of how the wholesale
market could operate in New Zealand, one only
needs to look at the New York Mercantile
Exchange in the United States, where milk is
traded in volumes.
A wholesale milk market consists of a
variety of contracts for the sale and purchase of
raw milk.  Sub markets, such as spot and futures
markets, may also be formed. The sub markets
are categorised according to the terms of the
contract. In the spot market, for example, the
contracts will be for the sale of goods today,
whereas in the futures market the contracts will
be for delivery of milk at some future date.
There will be an intimate connection between
the wholesale market and open entry and exit
from Global Dairy, because if there is a spot
market for milk any supplier or processor can
buy or sell milk on the spot market.
Potential participants in a wholesale milk
market include small specific-purpose proces-
sors like supermarkets who do not have their
own suppliers and would use the wholesale
market to sell their own product labels.
Established processors who have their own
suppliers, such as Tatua and Westland, could
use the wholesale market to balance surpluses
and shortfalls in supply that may arise from
climatic conditions. New entrants to the
market, both processors and suppliers, could
also use the wholesale market. A futures
element of the wholesale market would also
attract traders (‘scalpers’) who would try and
predict movements in the market and never
actually settle with the physical supply of milk.
To date, the development of
the wholesale market has been inhibited by 
the vertically integrated structure of
the industry (co-operative ownership). However
Global Dairy may have the incentive to offer
wholesale market services – such as the prices
at which it will buy and sell milk – to show that
it is not exploiting its dominant market position
in violation of the Commerce Act. In addition,
the wholesale market may provide Global Dairy
with more information about factors that
influence the milk price and thus assist in
setting the milk price to suppliers.
A wholesale milk market will also
discipline Global Dairy by the opportunity for
arbitrage it offers. Unless Global Dairy sets buy
and sell wholesale prices that accurately reflect
the costs of supply and demand, it could be
commercially damaged by the resultant
transactions. 
The unbundled annual price for its milk
may differ from the wholesale spot price for 
a number of reasons. The most obvious
example is that per-period contracts for fixed
amounts of milk will be at a higher price than
the spot price. This is because the per-period
contract provides certainty over the quantity
that will be delivered for the purchaser and any
seasonal or other factors that may cause
uncertainty of supply are borne by the supplier.
These legitimate differences in prices
have implications for regulatory enforcement.
The proposed entry and exit regulations must
be interpreted within the context of the
development of the broader wholesale market.
And because the spot price in a wholesale
market will vary for a number of reasons, the
enforcement body should have the expertise to
understand the dynamics of a wholesale milk
market.
1 Global Dairy will be required under regulation to publish a 
wholesale milk price.
T
A Market is Born
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he dairy industry merger includes
provision for regulation aimed at limiting
the potential for Global Dairy to use its market
power in the wide range of markets for dairy
products in New Zealand. It is the virtual
monopsony position of Global Dairy as the
purchaser of raw milk that is the source of
Global Dairy’s market power and there would
be no obvious benefit from imposing these
regulations on other companies in the 
New Zealand dairy industry. 
A good regulatory regime is one that is
confined to monitoring process rather than one
that specifies defined outcomes. This is because
in specifying defined outcomes the writers 
of the regulations must fully anticipate all
future contingencies that might arise. Since it is
impossible to accurately predict the future,
regulations that specify outcomes are bound to
be either unworkable or produce unintended
consequences in the future.
Regulating for specific outcomes, for
example by defining the actual calculation of
the price of milk, also requires very heavy
regulation which may adversely affect the
performance of Global Dairy. Of course
monitoring for process rather than for breaches
of specific outcomes requires judgement in
enforcement, which means that the regulatory
body will need to have the expertise to
undertake this role.
The regulatory environment planned by
government is to first ensure open entry and
exit1 by suppliers (as shareholders and potential
shareholders of Global Dairy) and promote the
efficient operation of markets for raw milk and
other products and services controlled by
Global Dairy.
The regulation of Global Dairy can be
divided into the following categories:
• Monitoring the behaviour of Global Dairy
• Resolving disputes that may arise
• Sanctioning breaches of regulations
In designing a regulatory framework, 
cost effectiveness is more likely to be achieved
when there are strong incentives for interested
parties to monitor and report alleged breaches
to a regulatory body. In this way the regulatory
body is much less likely to be ‘captured’ by 
the monitored party. Further, the regulatory
body is required only to resolve disputes and
impose sanctions.
Under the new dairy industry structure,
potential and existing Global Dairy sharehold-
ers will be transacting commercially with 
Global Dairy so they will have every incentive to
report disputes to the regulatory body for
resolution. Similarly, parties to actual and
potential contracts with Global Dairy in the
wholesale spot and contract market in milk will
have an incentive to report disputes. Thus
enforcement can be reactive to complaints,
rather than proactive in initiating investiga-
tions.
It must be recognised however that
Global Dairy will have access to financial
resources and information that will exceed that
of almost all potential claimants under the
regulations. This raises the potential for
complaints to be resolved in Global Dairy’s
favour due simply to the disparity of resourc-
ing. This needs to be taken into consideration
in determining the mechanism by which
disputes are resolved. For example, it is unlikely
that disputes can be resolved satisfactorily
when regulatory enforcement is in the hands of
the courts, because this mechanism relies on
claimants’ own recognisance and resources to
take up alleged breaches.
Various enforcement mechanisms, other
than relying on the courts, might be contem-
plated. These include the proposal for a Milk
Commissioner appointed by Global Dairy ’s
Shareholders’ Council, an independent Milk
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A Milk Commissioner appointed by Global
Dairy’s Shareholders’ Council is an unsatisfac-
tory option because the position will be a
creature of existing suppliers, not potential
suppliers or processors, therefore it cannot be
credibly capture free. However, the Milk
Commissioner may usefully assist the settle-
ment of contractual disputes involving Global
Dairy before disputes reach the enforcement
body.
Other options include a specialist Milk
Market Enforcement Panel or the Commerce
Commission as final arbiters of contract disputes
with Global Dairy. There are a number of issues
that would need to be addressed if the
Commerce Commission were appointed as
regulators:
• While decisions of the enforcement body
relating to market making must be within
the Commerce Act, much judgement is
called upon in assessing departures from
the Act. To put these decisions with 
the competition law watchdog, 
the Commerce Commission may inhibit
the development of the milk market.
• Unless the enforcement body of the
Commerce Commission retains a
constant membership, the body may lack
the necessary accumulation of expertise,
experience and consistency. 
• Because the government has sanctioned
a merger that the Commerce Commission
would not have allowed, the Commerce
Commission may be put in the position of
enforcing regulations that represent, in
part, behavioural undertakings by Global
Dairy that the Commerce Commission
itself would not have accepted.
• Although resolving disputes should be 
a fundamental part of the role of
the enforcement body, the Commerce
Commission per se does not deal with
dispute resolution. In its current role 
it deals only with investigating, sanction-
ing and defending its decisions in respect
of the Commerce Act (although the
proposal for the Telecommunications
Commissioner, affiliated to the
Commerce Commission, will have a
dispute resolution role).
• The Commerce Commission has enforced
structured undertakings (for example,
divestment of part of a company in 
a merger application) but not
behavioural undertakings.
The Commerce Commission would be 
the obvious body to assess when the market
share threshold for removal of specific 
regulation of Global Dairy has been reached.
However, if the Commerce Commission is also
the regulator it arguably has an incentive to
retain the regulations in its own interest. This
suggests that the Commerce Commission
should not also be the regulator if it is to
adjudicate on the ‘bright line’ test.2
An independent Milk Market
Enforcement Panel, sitting outside the
Commerce Commission and modelled after the
equivalent in the New Zealand electricity
market, could provide expertise and the
judgement required in a developing market. 
It would also be cost effective as it would only
meet to determine disputes and, being 
part-time without a monitoring role, would not
be unduly subject to capture.
1 See ‘What Does Open Entry to and Exit from Global Dairy Mean?’ this issue.
2 Although the test is ‘bright line’ there may well be judgement to be made
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he merger of the New Zealand Dairy
Board and New Zealand’s two largest 
co-operative manufacturers of milk products
will result in the transfer of most NZDB assets
and functions into a pure private commercial
operation. All of the public good activities of
NZDB will therefore need to be reconsidered.1
Genetic improvement of the herd is
critical to the development of the New Zealand
dairy industry. At the time of writing 
the Livestock Improvement Corporation (LIC) is
a wholly-owned subsidiary of NZDB. 
It is responsible for implementing the Dairy
Herd Improvement Plan for genetic improve-
ment in the dairy herd.2 
LIC also manages, operates and develops
the National Dairy Herd Improvement
Database, together with commercial businesses
that contribute to or utilise the database such
as:
• MINDA provides advisory and administra-
tive support to farmers and maintains
herd records in the database.
• The Herd Testing Service collects and tests
milk for specific characteristics and
records data.
• The Artificial Breeding Service maintains
bull statistics and manages semen 
processing.
• Breeding/Sire Selection Service manages
the sire proving scheme and DNA testing.
Clearly the creation of Global Dairy raises
a number of issues relating to the ownership,
structure and management of the National
Dairy Herd Improvement Database and of LIC
as it has both commercial and database
management activities.
There are strong analogies to problems in
network economics, where there is a core
facility that provides a range of services to
consumers. In this case the core facility has the
following combination of characteristics which
for the purposes of this paper we refer to as
public externalities:
• It would be inefficient for any firm to
duplicate the facility
• A public good (information) characteris-
tic, whereby use of the facility by one
party does not reduce the value of the
facility to other parties. While users can
be excluded from the database,
exclusionary use may well carry social
costs
• A positive network externality in that the
addition of users (individual farmer data)
increases the value of the database for
any other user.
Where strong externality elements are
present the industry should take these into
account. The optimal governance (ownership)
and regulatory regime for the elements of
the network that display natural monopoly and
public good characteristics will differ from
those elements of the network that do not
display these characteristics. It is not in 
the public interest to establish a regulated
monopoly in those areas of the network that
are susceptible to competition. However it may
be inefficient to provide for unregulated private
ownership of a facility with natural monopoly
and public good features. 
The potential inefficiencies that may arise
from private commercial ownership of a
natural monopoly or public good facility could
be alleviated by an ownership structure that
involves decision-making by all potential users.
This would ensure that decisions about access
to the facility maximise potential benefits to all
users, resolving the hold-up and monopoly
pricing problems associated with a natural
monopoly. It also provides a mechanism for
alleviating the commercial and pricing
T
The Market for Genetic
Information in the Dairy Industry
”Genetic
improvement 
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problems associated with the non-rival
component of the use of the data. A co-
operative in which all farmers and share-
milkers, who are potential users of the data 
are members, would provide an ownership
structure that approximated efficiency in these
circumstances.
At the time of writing supplying farmers,
through NZDB, control LIC but LIC provides
services to share-milkers as well as farmers.
Share-milkers take up 41% of LIC services. The
proposal is for LIC to be owned by its users
based on their historical pattern of use (and 
this includes share-milkers and suppliers). In
the absence of specified ownership, arguments
about the ownership of LIC must rest on
understandings about the property rights
stemming from the evolution of LIC from its
antecedents, and the public good characteris-
tics of LIC’s activities. However a key issue with
trusts, co-operatives and mutual companies is
that ownership is not sufficiently tight to
provide clear entitlement to their assets. 
If those elements of the database that
have public externalities can be defined, then it
will not be in the public interest to allocate
these to private entities for their exclusive use.
It will be in the public interest to enable these
public good externalities to be utilised through
regulation, or separation of the database
management function, providing there are
incentives and resources for the maintenance
and development of the database.
In the case of the National Dairy Herd
Database there is a clear separation between
the public good and proprietary aspects. The
public good aspect of the database comprises
all the records associated with the identification
(including location), lineage and performance
of individual animals together with 
the software and architecture that are used 
to manage and display the records. The 
proprietary aspect of the database is all of
those records relating to the interpretation of
the data, including the Breeding Worth (BW)
calculations undertaken by LIC to value animals
and the information systems used to conduct
the business of the different commercial 
activities of LIC (including herd testing, artificial
breeding, and dairy farm consultancy).3 In short
the core public good elements of the database
are the records providing the information about
individual animals required for bio-security 
and commercial activities. It does not include
the data derived from analysis of the informa-
tion about individual animals. 
As a test of this approach, consider 
the calculation of breeding worth. Breeding
worth is an interpretation of the data, not a
component of the data itself. Different organi-
sations will legitimately have different views
about how to calculate breeding worth. These
alternative views form the key component of
potential efficiency-enhancing competition in
the market for advice about breeding worth.
In some cases judgement will be required
about what is a pure commercial activity and
what is part of the public good database. For
example, aspects of MINDA facilitate genetic
research by providing for the identification of
animals and the verification of ancestry. In this
sense MINDA represents the type of public good
enhancement of basic data in which any stand
alone (co-operative) owner or manager of
the database should invest, but other aspects 
of MINDA may be commercial. However the
need for judgement about the separation of
commercial and public good aspects of the data
does not undermine the view that this separa-
tion can and should be achieved. 
The key issues posed by the existence of
a public good database are access and 
the interaction between the database and any
commercial activities. The Macdonald
Committee Report in the early 1990s noted a
conflict of interest with LIC being both
custodian of the database and manager of
commercial activities utilising the database. At
the time of writing the structure of LIC raises a
number of issues.
• The National Herd Improvement
Programme (NHIP), developed through
LIC, has a particular view about dairy
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improvement. However competing views
about how to implement a herd improve-
ment strategy would bring the benefits of
diversity and competition.
• Substantial transfers of intellectual
property may occur where LIC has an
opportunity to view the data access
requests of other organisations that
compete with it on a commercial basis.
• There is the potential for LIC to cross-
subsidise different parts of its operations
to its own benefit and the detriment of its
competitors.  While this may be mitigated
by open access to the database, it will
require enforcement of appropriate
access prices. This is traditionally very
difficult for a regulator dealing with a
vertically integrated company that holds
all the relevant information. 
• There would be a conflict of interest if LIC
were to become a regulator as well as
maintaining its commercial activities.
• It is only because LIC undertakes
commercial activities that a separate
Dairy Herd Improvement Tribunal is
required to deal with access issues. This
increases transactions costs and inhibits
the freedom of the management of the
database, which would not occur with 
a public good database.
Separation of the commercial and public
good aspects of LIC could be structural – through
regulation of the scope of the business – or
behavioural – through regulation of pricing and
contracts. Structural separation could be
achieved by separating LIC’s commercial activi-
ties or by transferring the database to another
entity. Structural separation is costly at the time
of separation but is likely to result in superior
performance and carry lower ongoing costs of
monitoring than regulatory separation. If the
principles on which access to the database were
enshrined in the constitution of the entity
managing it, and there were no commercial
conflicts of interest, there would be no need for
special-purpose regulatory oversight. Reliance
could be placed upon remedies under the
Commerce Act and the incentives of the owners.  
Even though the database is public good
in nature, there must be incentives for further
development of the database and other
potential databases in the future. Knowledge 
of the synergies between the uses of the data
and data provision would also facilitate the
development of databases. Some general
points can be made. 
• Co-operative ownership would assist data
acquisition because the benefit from use 
is linked to data supply. It could be
strengthened by insisting that usage of the
database implies a requirement to supply
data.  
• Licensing of those who routinely gather
data for the database (for example the
Herd Testing Service) cannot be the
responsibility of database management
unless the database is a separate entity
with no commercial functions. This
highlights the problem faced by the
current vertically-integrated structure
that has NZDB ownership of both LIC and
its herd-testing functions. 
• The advent of electronic means of data
transfer should reduce the cost of
transferring data and enable relatively
efficient contracts for the acquisition 
of data from the database without 
the requirement of vertically integrated
ownership. Allocating the responsibility
for licensing herd testers to the database
management should reduce, if not
eliminate, incentives for the emergence
of duplicate proprietary databases, even
for Global Dairy.
• While credible arguments can be
mounted for co-operative ownership of
the database and other aspects of the
dairy industry, these arguments are not
present with respect to service providers
such as herd testers and farm advisers.
There are organisational-performance
advantages in separating the database
from these service provider activities,
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contracts can be designed and made
available in conjunction with licensing.
• Structural separation would leave the
database management free to choose its
pricing strategies, subject to obligations
implied by its constitution, requirements
of the Commerce Act, and the ability for
data to be supplied by relevant data
users.  Because the database manager
would report to a board representing
users of the database, and since raising
the cost of access to the database will
simply raise the costs of the services and
innovations provided to farmers by using
the database, there would be no major
incentive problems associated with the
pricing of access under this structure.
It is difficult to think of any situation in
which exclusive access to elements of the
database would be in the public interest. Use of
the database can be proprietary and exclusive
even if the data in the database are not,
because the processes applied to the data will
be proprietary. If there is innovation that
suggests that other data should be collected,
and a private database (potentially) evolves to
do so, the management of the database still has
the option of seeking to purchase the process 
if it would like to provide it as a public good 
or deems that it should be acquired for 
bio-security reasons. Indeed, Industry Good Inc.
will have an important role to play in the
innovations and research it purchases. It should
influence the actions of the database manage-
ment, even if separate from that management,
and we can expect investment in the database
without exclusive contracts.
Further, imagine situations in which a
research company would require a guarantee of
ongoing access to bear the set-up costs of
undertaking a major research project but
ongoing access does not require exclusive use. 
So long as it is possible for any research organisa-
tion to retain the proprietary results of the
research that it undertakes, it is difficult to think
of examples where exclusive access as opposed to
ongoing access would be efficiency enhancing.
Under open access to the database the profit
from successful proprietary research that used
the data will lie where the innovation lies.
Even if there are benefits to exclusive
access contracts, there appear to be a substantial
range of risks associated with the writing of such
contracts. In the field of scientific discovery it 
is extremely difficult to anticipate what future
research potential and what future lines of
research may be valuable for the industry.
Exclusive contracts would preclude contestability
in scientific research (when there is evidence that
even in New Zealand there are enough organisa-
tions with capacity in genomic research to make
contestability a reality), reduce the range of uses
to which the data can be put, and hence may
foreclose other proprietary and public good
innovations that would otherwise take place.
Exclusive access to the data would also preclude
independent and contestable verification of the
results obtained by one research organisation.
Finally, exclusive access to data that may at some
point in the future prove to be critical for
commercial success in the dairy industry could,
if exclusive access was provided to Global Dairy,
create a barrier to entry in other parts of the
dairy industry.
The issues raised here warrant careful
consideration. It may be that the greatest value
from the commercial operations of LIC can be
achieved by spinning them off to the market.
This would create the opportunity for LIC to
focus on realising the huge gains to the dairy
industry that can be achieved through open
access to contestable genomic research utilising
the database.
1 Further where NZDB had a regulatory function this will also need to be
reconsidered due to a conflict of interest in respect of competitors and
potential competitors of Global Dairy.
2 The plan uses performance and breeding information to increase the
efficiency of the dairy industry.  This plan has a long history: it was agreed
between the Government and the NZDB in 1939 and operated with joint
government funding until 1992.  When LIC was formed in 1988 the Dairy
Herd Improvement Plan became the strategic plan of LIC.
3 Conceptually there is no basis on which to draw a ‘bright line’ between data
and the applications that use data, because even the selection and creation
of variables that become data in the database require the application of
theory and concepts. Nevertheless, a line can be drawn based upon
judgement that might include treating as data for ongoing maintenance at
least the information that has been acquired to the present day.
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he statutory position of the New Zealand
Dairy Board had been justified on the
grounds that the aggregation of New Zealand
dairy products for foreign distribution, marketing
and sale gave New Zealand market power in
foreign markets. This market power creates a
higher return to New Zealand dairy farmers and
thereby the nation. However what constitutes
‘market power’ needs to be determined in order
to assess any claim that New Zealand is better off
with a single dairy exporter.  
A firm has market power if it can raise its
price in a market simply by restricting supply to
that market, but in practice this is difficult to
verify.  Competition authorities adopt a number
of tests for market power. Under one test, a firm
is said to have market power if it can sustain a
5% price rise for one year. However it is the
nature and timing of the response of actual or
potential competitors to the raised price or
reduced supply that is more important in
determining the existence of market power.
Moreover the veracity of the test relies on the
assumption that actual or potential competi-
tors produce and sell essentially the same
product. Clearly prices may differ across firms
because their products differ and this does not
imply that market power exists, or that excess
profits are being made. Firms typically invest in
product differentiation in an attempt to
establish a distinct market for themselves and
competition in product differentiation may
ensure that no more than normal profits are
being achieved, at least over the long term.  
Competition authorities sometimes adopt
market share as a test of market power but this
can also be misleading. Although a low market
share strongly indicates a lack of market power,
a high market share does not necessarily mean
that a firm has market power. Again, what is
important is the reaction of actual and
potential competitors if prices are raised. In
some circumstances competitors can react
quickly and limit the effects of any price rise
even if their market share is very low.
Measuring market share is difficult. It
requires accurate data and reliable estimation
techniques.  Even in circumstances where there
is a lot of data, for example supermarket
products where large quantities are sold and
prices are measured electronically, results can
vary according to the techniques used and 
the definition of the market. The broader 
the market definition the less likely market
power will be observed. For example, sales of
a particular brand of yoghurt may dominate
when measured as a proportion of yoghurt
sales, but not as a proportion of dairy dessert
sales. 
Obviously NZDB could only have market
power in its foreign markets if it has a reason-
able market share in those markets. Although 
it has had a significant market share in the
international trade of dairy products – greater
than 30% – this does not imply that it has a
large share of world production or in any partic-
ular market. In fact, dairy products are typically
consumed in the country in which they are
produced and hence world dairy trade is very
small relative to world dairy production.
The table shows that New Zealand dairy
products form a very small proportion of the
dairy imports in many countries and imports of
dairy products are often small compared to
domestic production. Further, the variation in
market share over time indicates that there is not
the stability one would expect as a consequence
of market power. Thus a crude market share
T
Does The New Zealand Dairy





• Imported goods enter
market on same terms
and conditions as
domestic production.
• New Zealand has the
property rights on the
quota.




and the total amount
of quota.






• Importers are allocated
country quota. The
USA has the property
rights on the quota.
• New Zealand exporters
must negotiate with
importers so may not
gain from higher price
levels.
• ‘Weak-selling’ may
have some effect 
on returns to 
New Zealand 
dairy suppliers.
WATERSHED  FOR  NEW ZEAL AND DA IR Y  INDUSTR Y  –  PAGE  23
Percentage Share of New Zealand Dairy Exports on Dairy Imports in 1996
And the Minimum and Maximum Percentage Shares 1986-1996
Country 1996 Min Max Country 1996 Min Max Country 1996 Min Max
Belgium 2.45 0.05 2.45 Oman 0 0 5 Singapore 8 6 18
Denmark 1.1 0.01 1.1 Qatar 0 0 4.25 Sri Lanka 0 0 55
France 0.02 0 0.34 Algeria 0 0 24 Thailand 0 0 26
Germany 0.04 0.01 0.18 Senegal 0 0 7.5 Argentina 25 0 25
Greece 0 0 0.07 South Africa 0 0 9.8 Barbados 38 25 38
Italy 0.02 0 0.03 Tunisia 11.5 0 11.5 Brazil 0 0 13
Netherlands 0.8 0.4 1.4 Brunei 0 0 5.4 Colombia 0 0 35
Portugal 1 0 28 Fiji 0 0 75 Costa Rica 0 0 1
Spain 0.3 0.07 0.42 Kiribati 0 0 14 Ecuador 12 0 76
Sweden 0 0 0.4 P.N.G. 0 0 13 Guatemala 45 3 65
UK 16 10 18 Vanuatu 0 0 40 Honduras 0 0 13.8
Switzerland 0.5 0 0.5 China 2 0 34 Jamaica 0 0 30
Poland 0 0 25.5 Hong Kong 11.5 2 11.5 Mexico 0 0 23.5
Bahrain 0 0 9.5 India 0 0 45 Nicaragua 8 0 85
Cypress 0 0 11 Indonesia 37 20 42 Panama 0 0 57
Egypt 22 2 22 Korea Rep. 11 3 16 Venezuela 0 0 79
Jordan 0 0 40 Mauritius 0 0 17 Canada 10 3 10
Kuwait 0 0 16 Philippines 22 16 32 Japan 22 10 22
Malta 0 0 6 USA 10 6.2 10
analysis suggests that NZDB’s has achieved very
little market power in its foreign markets.  
A seemingly more sophisticated argument
in justification of a single exporter is that even
though it may not have a substantial market
share in foreign markets, it can substitute product
between markets according to market demand.
What’s more, it does not have to compete with
other New Zealand exporters in foreign markets –
the so-called case of ‘weak selling’. 
The weak selling argument can only arise
in cases where the relevant market segment has
limited sellers. It can occur where sellers are
limited by statutes that restrict entry (see the
case of the USA in the EU and USA Comparison).
The claim by NZIER (Report Prepared for
NZDB, 1998) that monopsony purchase confers
special abilities to allocate product to markets in
order to maximize returns to dairy exports is not
defensible. In fact, any exporting entity would
adopt the same strategy. Moreover, even if NZDB
has had a positive margin in its foreign markets
this does not of itself represent market power.
Many countries restrict entry to their markets to
maintain high prices for their suppliers. Thus a
quota allocation to NZDB simply confers a right to
sell a certain amount in a market with an artifi-
cially high price. It does not imply that NZDB has
market power in that market. Indeed there may
be vigorous competition at that price. It is access
to the market that generates the returns and this
is the only situation where ‘weak selling’ will be an
issue. Whether the exporting country enjoys fully
the higher prices depends upon how quotas are
administered in the importing country. 
This is not to deny that in certain cases,
perhaps as the result of intellectual property
investments in the past, New Zealand may enjoy
returns that exceeds that of other countries’
exports.  Such returns are the return to successful
and unsuccessful past investment and they rest
with the intellectual property holder.  They do not
represent market power per se.
In conclusion, the evidence indicates that
NZDB has not had market power in its foreign
markets and there is no compelling reason to
maintain a single exporter of dairy exports on
the basis that it will have market power in
foreign markets in the future. The creation of
Global Dairy as a monopsony purchaser of raw
milk will not confer on it any more market
power in foreign markets than it did on its
predecessor.
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he farmers’ vote creating Global Dairy
will result in a company with over 90% 
of the market for the purchase of raw milk and
for the manufacture of processed dairy
products in New Zealand. From the perspective
of competition law there are three features 
of the merger process that are particularly
noteworthy:
• The proposal was not assessed by the
Commerce Commission whose function it
is to consider whether mergers are
consistent with the preservation of
economic efficiency in markets, and 
if they are not, to prevent them going
ahead.
• The vote has created a company whose
market share is substantially in excess of
the safe harbours normally applied by
the Commerce Commission, and comes
at a time when the government has
moved to strengthen the terms of the
Commerce Act by focussing the assess-
ment of merger proposals on market
power rather than dominance.
• Implementing the merger requires the
removal of the existing regulatory
structure and new regulations relating to
competition and the conduct of Global
Dairy in dairy markets. 
The approach taken by the Commerce
Commission to the analysis of a merger is to
first consider whether a dominant position is
likely to be created or strengthened.1 To make
this assessment, the Commerce Commission
considers whether, in the relevant markets, the
merged entity will be constrained from raising
prices above or reducing output below the
competitive level by:
• rivalry within the market;
• constraints imposed by the threat of
entry; and / or
• constraints imposed by buyers or
suppliers.
If it finds that dominance is likely, then
the merger can only be authorised if the public
benefits from the merger outweigh the public
detriments. The Commerce Commission
considers both the performance of and benefits
to New Zealand producers and consumers in its
deliberations.
In its draft determination on the dairy
industry Mega-Merger proposal of 1999, the
Commerce Commission took the view that
efficiency losses substantially outweighed the
efficiency gains arising from the new structure.2
In their view, efficiency losses in the domestic
market would be small by comparison with the
large productive and dynamic efficiency losses
resulting from the absence of competitive
pressure on those aspects of the merged entity
that would not be subject to direct competition
in international markets. In short, an absence
of domestic processing competition.
The rationale for change in the structure
of the dairy industry presented in the 
Global Dairy proposal proved to be more
convincing than the arguments presented in
1999. It was argued that although the 
New Zealand Dairy Board may have been an
effective way to maximise the returns from
international marketing when there were 
500 dairy co-operatives, the structure was no
longer efficient in 2001 when a large part of the
dairy manufacturing industry was controlled by
two co-operatives. The proposal further
suggested that the costs of splitting the
operations of NZDB between two competing
companies were so high that a merger of
the two large co-operatives with NZDB provided
the only practical means of achieving vertical
integration in the industry.
T
Global Dairy 
and Competition Law 
“The rationale 
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The creation of Global Dairy raises at least
four other issues that represent legitimate
questions for competition policy in New Zealand.  
First, is the threshold and other criteria
used for intervention in other (much) larger
economies relevant to New Zealand? In those
industries where there are strong economies of
scale, and where vertical integration is the
efficient form of production, the New Zealand
market may be so small as to preclude interna-
tional competitiveness except at high domestic
market shares. Applying the criteria for mergers
used by other countries may reduce the scope
for firms that are large by international
standards to emerge through takeovers within
the domestic market.3
For some firms it may be possible to take
advantage of economies of scale and scope by
expanding outside New Zealand. To do this
however, requires that the firms have some
production or management technology that is
superior to those of existing firms in other
countries. This may or may not be the source of
the economies of scale that drive merger
proposals within the domestic market.
Second, in evaluating merger proposals
the Commerce Commission estimates the costs
and benefits to New Zealand consumers and
producers. For export industries the benefits of
a merger include the increased profit to
producers arising from export sales that arise
from the merger. Any benefits to foreign
consumers are ignored. Any extra profits 
to exporters represent extra value added
generated by the merger that may be utilised in
various ways by New Zealand residents for their
benefit. For export industries the issue may
come down to trading off costs to the domestic
market against benefits from better exporting
performance. For large export industries very
small benefits to exporting may be all that is
required to offset any detriments to the
domestic market. In the domestic market the
creation of Global Dairy means a move from
duopoly and small competing firms to
monopoly and small competing firms.
Third, Global Dairy is a producer co-
operative. Co-operative ownership does nothing
to reduce concerns about the exercise of market
power in respect of consumers of milk products,
but (provided that there is open entry to and exit
from the co-operative) it does remove the
prospect that Global Dairy can exercise market
power in the market for raw milk. In respect of a
producer co-operative that exports virtually all of
its output, should the Commerce Commission
have a role in assessing the co-operative’s
productive efficiency in the purchase of raw milk
and the manufacture of dairy products? Such a
role amounts to no more than a check on the
rationality of suppliers and the assessments they
make as the co-operative’s owners. 
Fourth, the proposal to divest Dairy Foods
to provide competition in the domestic retail
market does nothing to reduce concerns resulting
from the fact that Dairy Foods will be reliant on
Global Dairy for supplies of raw milk and some
milk products.  These concerns can probably only
be met by behavioural undertakings from Global
Dairy of the type that will be embodied in govern-
ment regulations, although there exist small dairy
product producers now and there may be entry 
of downstream users of dairy processing – such as
supermarket companies – into raw milk process-
ing. Additionally, the potential to import dairy
products, including even fresh milk based
products, provides some market discipline on
final dairy product prices to New Zealand
consumers.
The Commerce Commission is concerned
only with behaviour that might contravene The
Commerce Act; it does not accept behavioural
undertakings from merged entities, so
structural solutions (such as divestment of
certain parts of the business) provide the only
approach available to meet the Commerce
Commission’s concerns about the merger. If a
merger raises concerns about lessening of
competition that could be alleviated by
behavioural undertakings, such undertakings
must be embodied in legislation or related
regulations. In such cases, the merger must be
considered by government rather than by 
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In the case of Global Dairy, the highly
regulated structure of the dairy industry has
also affected the choice between Commerce
Commission and government assessment of the
merger. It is likely that full vertical integration
of manufacturing and processing would have
emerged long ago in the absence of the legisla-
tion creating an export monopoly for NZDB. 
At the same time, certain types of competition
(such as from multinational milk processors
and marketers) have been precluded by 
the regulations. Bypassing the Commerce
Commission therefore needs to be viewed as
part of a legislative package designed to
deregulate the industry, create a vertically
integrated firm of international scale, and
impose behavioural restrictions on that firm
over the period in which new competition
emerges in the deregulated environment.  
There are precedents for the creation of
entities with very large market shares without
reference to the Commerce Commission, and for
the approval of mergers with very high market
shares. For example, when the government 
re-established the Accident Compensation
Corporation (ACC) as a state monopoly provider
of workplace accident compensation services,
the Commerce Commission was neither asked to
authorise nor assess the efficiency of the move.
The Commerce Commission declined to
authorise Southern Cross’ acquisition of Aetna
on the grounds that Southern Cross would
acquire a near 80% share of the health
insurance market and that there are barriers to
the entry of competitors. The High Court
allowed an appeal from the Commerce
Commission’s decision on the grounds that
substantial market share alone is not sufficient
to provide for dominance in the presence of low
barriers to entry. The Court found that the
barriers to entry are low in the health insurance
market and that in response to higher prices
other insurers could take advantage of
economies of scope and scale from their
existing businesses to enter the market.
When the government privatised Telecom
Corporation of New Zealand (Telecom), an
entity was created with extremely high market
shares in New Zealand telecommunications
markets without reference to the Commerce
Commission. Global Dairy is like Telecom in
being subject to competition law and certain
additional behavioural regulations from 
its creation.4 Perhaps more importantly 
Global Dairy, like Telecom, will be operating in
markets that are contestable.
In the case of the privatisation of
Telecom, the order and pace of change was
carefully considered to ensure that a dislocation
in performance did not arise as a result 
of restructuring occurring simultaneously with
deregulation. 
The relationship between NZDB and the
two large co-operatives is informal and implicit in
many respects. Moving to a more formal separate
structure will be a major exercise that would be
best contemplated at some time other than when
deregulation occurs. Global Dairy allows ‘business
as usual’ to continue at the same time that
deregulation of the industry takes place and
export competition is introduced.  
Telecom was privatised after first being a
state-owned enterprise and New Zealand Post’s
market was deregulated after it had time to
develop as a business. In the same way the
creation of Global Dairy will allow full deregula-
tion of dairy product exports to take place with
minimal prospect of dislocation, while preserving
the opportunity for Global Dairy to evolve over
time in response to competitive forces.
The need to remove the regulations that
have determined the past structure of the 
New Zealand dairy industry, and the need to
impose behavioural undertakings on Global
Dairy while competition emerges in the deregu-
lated environment, make the Global Dairy
merger look more like the privatisation 
of Telecom, the removal of private delivery 
of accident compensation insurance, and 
the deregulation of New Zealand Post, than
merger proposals that are normally considered
by the Commerce Commission. Mergers that
require major (de)regulation are not necessarily
best considered by the Commerce Commission.
















1 Commerce Commission (1996) ‘Business
Acquisition Guidelines’ Wellington.
Amendments to the Commerce Act passed
in May 2001 will result in the test being
whether the merger is likely to substan-
tially lessen competition in a market.  For
commentary see David, Grant (2001) ‘The
Change to the Business Acquisition
Regime’ paper presented at the IIR
Competition Law Conference (Wellington)
24 May.
2 For a summary see Quigley, Neil (2001)
‘Evaluation of the December 2000 Dairy
Industry Merger Package From the
Perspective of Competition Policy’ (A
report for the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry) 11 January.
3 Firms may grow ‘organically’ and displace
other firms but takeovers are the most
common method by which large market
shares are acquired.
4 In the case of Telecom the behavioural
regulation was incorporated in the Kiwi
Share.
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he statutory export monopoly of the 
New Zealand Dairy Board may have
made economic sense in the past by reducing
the cost of foreign marketing for a large
number of small co-operatives, but this
argument has long since lost its validity in the
process of merger and acquisition that has
reduced 499 processing co-operatives in 1933 to
two large and two small co-operatives and the
NZDB by the turn of the century.
The NZDB has had the role of co-ordinat-
ing the production, marketing and timely
delivery of commodity dairy products. It was
also required to be responsive to foreign
consumer demand for new dairy products. Up
until the merger that created Global Dairy from
the two largest processing co-operatives and the
NZDB, the NZDB was co-operatively owned by
the four processors but no one processing co-
operative had control of its management or
strategic direction.  NZDB negotiated the alloca-
tion of processing among the co-operatives and
the co-operatives competed with each other for
the most profitable products. This means that
NZDB’s product allocation decisions were not
based solely on efficiency criteria but also took
account of the political economy issues that
arose as a result of co-operative ownership. This
inevitably contributed to delays and non-
performance that was ultimately reflected in
the earnings from the NZDB’s foreign
customers.
The two largest dairy co-operatives, Kiwi
Dairies and New Zealand Dairy Group, and the
NZDB itself made separate investments in the
dairy industries of other countries prior to the
merger, giving the New Zealand co-operatives
the ability to market and distribute their
processed products through entities in foreign
countries in competition with NZDB. This
investment in foreign markets created mixed
incentives for the co-operatives as owners of
NZDB and increased the co-ordination costs of
doing business. 
These investments may have been made
to facilitate growth that was limited by the 
New Zealand market and the constraints 
of NZDB, or in preparation for the demise of
NZDB (since without an overseas presence 
the co-operatives would have had limited
opportunities for establishing themselves in
and learning about overseas markets prepara-
tory to deeper involvement). Foreign invest-
ment by either co-operative may also have been
part of a strategy to compete for NZDB on its
demise. If this was the case, the ‘investment
race’ was a risky one for shareholders. Whatever
the case, the investment of the co-operatives
and NZDB in foreign dairy entities suggests that
they saw, in the presence of NZDB, limited
benefits in a co-ordinated approach to foreign
markets by New Zealand dairy co-operatives.
This in turn offers limited support for the view
that single-desk selling has negligible market
power benefits to New Zealand. 
The core of Global Dairy’s strategy is to
improve processing, marketing and distribution
of dairy products in foreign markets and to
develop its ownership of dairy businesses in
those markets to add value for their 
New Zealand shareholders. It is a strategy that
says that the New Zealand dairy industry has
the technology to manage businesses in any
country, and that the New Zealand dairy
industry has some comparative advantage in
processing, distribution and marketing. 
New Zealand’s traditional comparative
advantage has been considered to lie in milk
production rather than in processing. The
claims for comparative advantage from process-
ing and marketing are difficult to evaluate, for
although the New Zealand dairy industry has
been innovative, the strategy of the large co-
operatives has been the production of
commodity milk products at low cost and less in
developing and marketing innovative high-
value products. 
T
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Now that NZDB’s time is up, is Global
Dairy the best alternative? Another viable
alternative was for one of the two large co-
operatives to buy NZDB on removal of its
statutory single desk status. The other co-
operative would then have been left to make its
own arrangements with respect to foreign
marketing and sales. This could have meant
developing its own marketing network, or
contracting to an existing dairy products sales
network (an option that the co-operatives had
clearly already pursued through investment in
foreign entities). This two dairy company 
model would have had the advantage of
domestic competition in processing and
enabled shareholders to benchmark manage-
ment performance. 
Like Global Dairy, a two company model
would have mitigated the processing and
allocation problem that existed between NZDB
and the co-operatives. Mergers are potentially
disruptive but Global Dairy seems preferable:
Global Dairy merged three entities, whereas a
two dairy company set-up would have created
two entities from (at most) two mergers. 
Among the co-operative dairy companies
and NZDB is a nexus of informal arrangements
that would be difficult to manage if one co-
operative were to break away. First, the arrange-
ments would have to be formalised in contract
– in much the same way as trading government
departments were converted to state owned
enterprises – and then these contracts would
have to be valued. Given the long history of
informal arrangements both these steps would
have entailed much conflict, and even litiga-
tion. To implement structural change simulta-
neously with de-regulation of the industry may
have led to high adjustment costs.
Economies of scale might favour Global
Dairy, although it is likely that these would lie
in the area of marketing and distribution rather
than processing per se. While there are some
exhaustible economies in plant size, processing
capital is a very small proportion of total
processing cost, which is dominated by the 
cost of the raw milk. 
Both the alternatives retain the 
co-operative structure that many would argue 
is less efficient than the corporate form of
business organisation, where shares are traded,
however open entry and exit does create the
incentives for a co-operative to approximate 
the efficient level of output. Retention of
New Zealand supplier-only control under both
alternatives creates issues over capital structure,
such as the cost of raising capital and the
limitations on potential foreign ownership and
joint venture arrangements, and these issues
will inevitably arise with significant successful
integration into foreign dairy markets. 
The political economy of the dairy
industry is a major factor in its evolution and 
its current options. The centralisation of
the industry ’s processing activities and 
the importance of dairy in the rural regions
have facilitated a strong political voice for 
the industry. This has resulted in heavy
industry-specific regulation. Such are the
interlocking co-operative and regulatory
relationships that it is not possible to eliminate
the statutory single desk without major legisla-
tive and organisational change. Further,
without the support of suppliers any organisa-
tional/regulatory change will be very difficult
and disruptive. Milk suppliers had the 
opportunity to accept or reject the Global Dairy
proposal. Their vote to create Global Dairy is a
way forward to a modern dairy industry.
However the result is their responsibility.
Efficiency requires that the government make
dairy farmers live with the economic
consequences of their decision, whatever they
may be.
“Efficiency
requires that 
the government
make dairy
farmers live with
the economic
consequences 
of their decision,
whatever 
they may be.”
